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"I declare that we shall train them -for
terrorist and suicide missions and allocate
trainers -for them and place all the weapons
needed -for such missions at their disposal."
-Muammer el-Qadda-fi
Tripoli, January 15, 1986
New York Times
"The one means that wins the easiest victory
over reason: terror and -force. "
-Adol-f Hitler
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1 . 1 Introduct ion
International terrorism has become the major threat
to our shore -facilities in the 1980's. Terrorist
attacks have damaged American buildings and killed and
injured American personnel, both military and civilian.
One way to counter the increasing terrorist threat is
to design our -facilities to minimize damage resulting
from a terrorist attack. This paper will -focus on some
o-f the design and structural methods that can be used to
protect a -facility -from a terrorist attack.
Terrorism is on the rise. The number of terrorist
attacks has increased almost every year -from the early
1970's to the present. Although there were some years
when the total number o-f terrorist incidents did not
rise signi-f icant ly , the number o-f casualties and amount
o-f damage resulting -from those attacks did increase
during those years. In other words, the severity o-f
terrorist attacks is rising at least as -fast as the
shear number o-f attacks.
From 1970 to 1984 there were more than 23,000
terrorist incidents that le-ft more than 41,000 dead and
24,000 wounded. According to Dr. Ikle (Under Secretary
o-f Defense) , terrorism increased more than 40% in 1983
to a total o-f over 700 attacks. The estimates -for 1986
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and -future years are -for international terrorism to
continue to increase to over 800 incidents per year.
The United States is a target -for many terrorist
acts- Since 1969, terrorists have killed or wounded
over 1000 Americans. Fi-fty percent D-f terrorism in the
1980's is directed towards American -facilities2 . Who
can -forget the 1983 bombings o-f the American embassy and
marine barracks in Beirut with combined deaths o-f over
250? The many kidnappings in the Middle East, the
hijackings o-f the Achille Lauro and TWA Flight 847 in
1985 each resulting in the death of one American, and
the numerous other bombings and attacks on embassies,
restaurants, nightclubs and other targets throughout the
world, are evidence o-f the rising tide o-f terrorism.
Even as recently as December, 1987, the USO club in
Barcelona, Spain was attacked by a lone terrorist with a
hand grenade causing yet another American casualty due
to terrorism. As one author put it, "Welcome to World
War III."*
Thus, the rise o-f terrorism is a serious threat to
American interests overseas. It is necessary -for the
United States to take de-fensive measures to protect its
overseas -facilities -from damage and loss o-f li-fe. This
paper will concentrate on the design and construction
options available to help counter the terrorist threat,
especially structural and perimeter defenses.
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1 . 2 The De-finition o-f Terrorism
Terrorism is not easy to de-fine but there are many
aspects o-f terrorism that are common in most
de-f ini t ions. There is, however, still a -fine line
between terrorism and guerilla war-fare.
One de-finition o-f terrorism was o-f-fered by Dr. Ray
Cline as "the deliberate employment o-f violence or
threat o-f the use o-f violence to commit acts in
violation o-f law -for the purpose o-f creating
overwhelming -fear in a target population larger than the
number o-f victims attacked or threatened.'"* This
de-finition, with some minor mod i -f icat ions, has been used
by many others to de-fine terrorism as simply as
possible.
However, terrorism is not simple. What
d i-f -f erent iates the terrorist -from the soldier? Is a
lone gunman who takes a store clerk hostage a terrorist?
There are several attributes o-f terrorism that set it
aside as a special category o-f crime and war-fare.
First, the terrorist target almost always consists
o-f innocents. Terrorists seldom attack an opposing
-force in a direct confrontation as would occur between
soldiers in a battle or war. Military personnel are
o-ften the target o-f terrorism, such as the Marine
barracks in Beirut, but the attacks are not carried out
during a time o-f declared war with the target.
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Guerillas and soldiers wage war on soldiers and, unlike
most terrorist acts, do not kill civilians or neutral
soldiers as an objective. This is not to say that
innocent civilians are not o-ften casualties o-f war,
declared or guerilla, but that they are usually
undesired casualties, whereas the terrorist will target
civilians spec i-f ical ly
.
Terrorism involves a willingness to commit crimes
and use violence to shock, stun or intimidate a target
group. The objective o-f the terrorist is to obtain some
political or idealogical goal by creating social
con-flict or unrest. Their overall goal is to use
isolated violent attacks to influence or destabilize a
government. Their speci-fic goals vary widely -from
simply disrupting or discrediting governments or other
groups to -formation o-f a new government or country.
From the above attempt to de-fine terrorism, it can
be seen that terrorism is not always easy to nail down.
What one group o-f people may consider terrorism, another
may consider guerilla war-fare with legitimate goals.
Guerilla groups and armies can commit terrorist acts
even though they may not technically be referred to as a
terrorist organization. The one common thread running
through all definitions o-f terrorism is the willingness
to use violence against innocents and neutrals. This
violence is increasing in magnitude.
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1.3 The Terrorist Threat
The previous sections de-fined terrorism and
indicated the need to protect -facilities -from terrorist
attack. Be-fore an engineer can design a defense,
however, he must have some indication o-f what the threat
might be.
In addition to the number o-f attacks increasing,
the violence o-f each attack is also increasing. The
weapons o-f the terrorist are becoming more
sophisticated, e-f-ficient and deadly. Attacks can o-ften
be launched -from considerable distances or concealed
weapons can be easily snuck into the target area. I-f
one objective o-f terrorism is to instill -fear in a
target populace, then the terrorist will use whatever
weapon is required to cause the most damage and death
possible. This means that hijackings and kidnappings
that resulted only in -fleeting press attention are
losing the appeal they once had. Bombings and
assassinations have taken the -fore-front o-f the terrorist
arsenal, and these tactics do result in more death.
The weapon o-f choice among terrorists today is the
bomb. The types o-f bombs used vary and a bomb may take
hundreds o-f di-f-ferent -forms. Bombs vary -from the letter
or shopping bag bomb, which is normally used to kill a
speci-fic individual, to the car bomb, which can be used
to kill speci-fic targets and/or damage -facilities. The
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de-fense against a bomb will also vary with the bomb
type. It should be noted that bombs can be detonated in
a number o-f di-f-ferent ways, -From contact to -fuses
operated by handling the bomb (i.e., the letter bomb) to
remote control fuses. Bombs can also be shaped by
using plastic explosives to resemble almost any common
object, such as a brie-fcase .
Another common weapon used by terrorists is small
arms. The developement o-f new types o-f small arms
continues with such innovations as the all-plastic gun
which can avoid detection by metal detectors. Small
arms ammunition has also advanced to the advantage o-f
the terrorist. For example, KTW (Te-f Ion-coated ) armor-
piercing bullets, the "black steel projectile", and
rapid energy armor piercing rounds have all been -found
in terrorist stocks*. Small arms and ammunition are
readily available and inexpensive to terrorist groups.
Stand-o-f-f weapons, including mortars, portable
rockets and missiles and rocket propelled mortars have
become increasingly popular with terrorists, especially
with the willingness o-f some state sponsers to provide
them. These weapons are extremely dangerous to
personnel and -facilities and are popular with terrorists
for both their destructive potential and their stand-o-f-f
-feature. The terrorist does not need to expose himsel-f
when using these weapons.
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Perhaps the most dangerous terrorist weapon is a
chemical, biological or nuclear device. The potential
for damage to personnel, -facilities and the economy by
use o-f one o-f these weapons is unimaginable. There is
increasing evidence that these weapons are becoming
available to terrorists. Since the only real de-fense
against these types o-f weapons is to control the
availability o-f the weapon itsel-f, a monumental i-f not
impossible task, they will not be discussed in this
paper. Sooner or later, however, a terrrorist group may
hold a whole city, and thus a nation, hostage with a
nuclear device.
As technology increases so will the e-f -f ect i veness
and deadliness o-f terrorist weapons. They will become
harder to detect and more di-f-ficult to de-feat. This
makes the job o-f the engineer trying to design to
protect -facilities -from the terrorist threat more
di-f-ficult and more important. As terrorists obtain
newer, more advanced weapons, new de-fenses must be
developed to counter the threat.
There are a -few developments in modern day
terrorism that the design engineer should be aware o-f to
determine the scope o-f the threat. First is the rise o-f
state terrorism. Several countries are known to
actively support, encourage, -fund and supply terrorism.
Countries such as Iran, Syria, Lybia, Nicaraugua, Cuba,
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East Germany, the Soviet Union, North Korea and many
others support terrorism in some direct manner. This is
one method -for a terrorist group to obtain the weapons
described above. State supported terrorism is on the
rise, posing a serious threat to possible targets .
Terrorist groups are also joining together to
support one another. What may be the worst recent
terrorism developement is evidence that many terrorist
groups, especially those operating in South America,
such as the Shining Path group, and the Middle East,
such as the Amal , the PLO and the Islamic Jihad, are now
joining forces with drug smuggling organizations.
Terrorist groups acting together or with other illegal
organizations double the threat and increase the level
o-f violence that may be used by these groups. Money
from drug operations help to -finance weapons purchases.
There is evidence now that terrorist groups are moving
into the drug smuggling business to -finance their
organizations. By doing this, some organizations may
move away -from their original idealogical goals and
towards a profit goal. Although that may reduce their
attacks against innocents, new drug smuggling operations
are just as undesirable as -fanatical terrorist
organizations. In the United States, there is also
growing evidence that domestic and -foreign terrorist
groups are joining with street gangs to gain entrance
into the profitable U.S. drug trade.
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1 . 4 Responses to Terrorism
There are many methods available to try to -fight
terrorism. The responses typically -fall into the
political arena, legal areas, military/counter-attack
options, and de-fensive options. This paper will deal
with the de-fensive options but the other responses do
merit brie-f attention.
Politically, the options to combat terrorism are
numerous. The largest single -factor is cooperation
between nations. Pressure must be put on all state
sponsors o-f terrorism -from all other countries.
Intelligence must be shared among nations. Terrorism o-f
all -forms should be condemned by all concerned. This
will not be easy but should be a primary goal o-f the
United States, the #1 target o-f terrorism.
Legally, laws can be passed in the United States
that can help to prosecute terrorists and prevent
terrorist acts -from occurring in the United States. The
main hurdle in the legal area is the de-finition o-f
terrorism. Congress has passed laws such as Public Law
98-473 that makes it a crime to siege, detain, threaten
to kill or otherwise commit terrorist acts against
Americans. Public Law 98-533 o-f-fers a $500,000 reward
for in-formation leading to the arrest o-f terrorists.
But a law making it illegal -for American individuals or
businesses to support terrorism has not been passed due
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to con-fusion about the definition o-f terrorism. Many
Americans -feel it is their right to support "guerilla"
groups such as the Irish Replubican Army, the
Palistinian Liberation Organization, the Contras,
African National Congress and others. The distinction
between these "political" groups and terrorists can be a
f ine 1 ine.
Another option -for the United States is to mount a
counter-attack or retaliatory strike. The use o-f
military -force to deter terrorism is a controversial
issue. The main problem -for the United States in using
military strikes is ensuring that the attack is directed
at the right target. In other words, be-fore a
retaliatory strike can be staged, the perpetrators o-f
the terrorist act or their sponsors must be clearly
identified. Otherwise, innocents may be attacked, which
would cause even more ant i -Amer ican -feelings among the
countries involved. The Reagan administration did
launch a counter-strike on Lybia shortly after a bomb
exploded in a West German nightclub that is frequented
by American servicemen. A commercial airliner carrying
the terrorists involved in the hijacking of the TWA
flight and killing of an American serviceman was
intercepted by U.S. fighters and forced to land in
Italy, where they were promptly arrested.
There are many other responses to terrorism that can
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be taken by the United States, but the e-f -f ect i veness o-f
any o-f them is questionable. The political process can
be long and requires cooperation and agreement -from
countries that may never be willing to give it. The
legal options have the same problem, lack o-f
cooperation, plus lack D-f recognition o-f international
laws and U.N. authority, along with the problem o-f
legally de-fining terrorism and separating it -from
legitimate political groups. The military options can
be a viable deterrence to terrorism but has the problem
o-f identi-fying the targets. Most other responses have
similar problems and no action is likely to eliminate
terrorism completely'.
Democratic societies, such as the United States, are
particularly vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Even i-f
the government o-f a democracy is ready to use -force
against terrorists, the actions may be met with
resistance -from the general public, the voters. I-f a
democratic country is attacked itsel-f, thus -far a rarity
in the United States, and the government has to resort
to such methods as martial law to combat it, then the
terrorists have succeeded in one o-f their goals,
disrupting the government and causing dissent in the
general populace. The structure o-f a democratic
government and the ideas on which democracy is based,
i.e. -freedom, make it an ideal target -for terrorism.
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So what can the United States do? It should -follow
all o-f the above responses and pursue covert actions
against terrorists. However, protection o-f likely
targets should have a high priority. Terrorism will be
around -for a long time, designing our -facilities to
reduce its e-f-fects is one action the United States can





2. 1 The Threat Analysis
Be-fore an engineer can begin to design a -facility
that is a possible target -for terrorists, the
probability o-f terrorist attack, the terrorists that may
be involved and the type o-f weapons likely to be used
should be identified or assumed. These criteria are
most o-ften evaluated at the beginning o-f the design
cycle by developing a threat analysis. Although the
designer is not o-ften responsible -for developing the
threat analysis, he should be aware o-f how it is being
prepared and who is involved in its preparation. This
will allow the designer to adequately determine the best
way to protect the -facilities under design.
Some o-f the items that should be included in the
threat analysis are:
1. Terrorist groups active in the area
including the number o-f groups, number D-f members, goals
o-f each group, methods normally employed by each group
and type o-f target attacked by each group.
2. The type o-f weapons available and used
by terrorists who may attack the -facility under design.




4. The local law enforcement agencies that
can deter or prevent an attack or provide assistance in
the case o-f an attack.
5. The local political climate, especially
in regards to their support or resistance to terrorism.
All o-f the above items and more can assist planners
in determining what level o-f protection should be
designed into the
-facility.
The preparation o-f the threat analysis should be a
team e-f-fort. Members o-f the team include the -following:
the customer or his representative (the Commanding
O-f-ficer in the case o-f a military facility); security
specialists; members o-f various law enforcement
agencies, especially those knowledgeable with local
threats and local law enforcement capabilities; the
designer; and anyone else who has an important interest
in the project or special knowledge of the threat.
The designer and physical security specialists are
important members of the threat analysis team. They can
identify design options to meet the threat early on in
the process and the associated costs of each option.
They can also assist in evaluating the damage and loss
of life that might occur should a specific attack be
launched
.
The team involved in preparing the threat analysis
is an extension of the design team. The differences
between the design team, as discussed below, and the
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threat analysis team is in the area o-f specialists. The
threat analysis requires members with law enforcement
and intelligence backgrounds who are knowledgeable with
terrorist activities. The design team specialists
include the appropriate engineering disciplines (i.e.,
electrical, structural, mechanical, security, etc.).
However, in a long term project, law en-f orcement
,
intelligence and security personnel should be consulted
o-ften as the political climate and terrorist activities
in many areas are constantly changing.
Computer simulation has become useful in evaluating
the threat. Many programs are now available that will
give a threat analysis with various inputs.
2. 2 The Design Team
The design team involved in designing a project
with physical security as a priority can be a little
more complex than the normal design team. Once the
threat has been determined and reported in the threat
analysis, the design team must determine what to
protect, type o-f protection desired, amount o-f
protection necessary and type and degree o-f damage that
can be considered acceptable. The answers to these
questions must then be used as a basis -for the security
design .
The security design team should include
representatives -from operations (the users o-f the
-15-

system), security, support services and administration
along with the architects/engineers. The users, or
customer, have proven invaluable on design teams in
helping to design speci-fic security systems 11 . The
design team should include strong command/management
involvement to ensure that security needs do not
override other desires, such as aesthetics and
-functional use, that may also be considered important.
Once the security analysis is complete, the next
step is to per-form a security, or vulnerability,
assessment. The security assessment will determine what
resources are already in existence at the project site
and what additional requirements must be met. It should
be kept concise and simple and should identi-fy the
f ol lowi ng:
-Mission o-f the -facility;
-Site assessment;
-Risk analysis and reduction;
-Personnel and vehicle access requirements;
-Physical and electronic security sytems
necessary;
-Security -forces requirements. 1 *
From the above, the design team can now begin the
actual design o-f a secure -facility.
-16-

2.3 What to Protect
"You can have perfect physical security and
still be penetrable by visa applicants and
garbage collectors."
-Yehiel Fromer
President, Slocoor, Inc. 13
A major part o-f the design team efforts early on
will be to decide what should be protected. Should the
whole project be protected or just a part o-f it? The
amount o-f protection -finally decided on will be a
function o-f the threat and o-f the amount o-f -funds
available. A cost versus loss analysis should be
completed to determine exactly how much protection can
be provided.
The designer will have to provide protection in
many areas o-f the project. Structurally, the walls,
roofs and -floors, windows and doors may all require
hardening or some other -form o-f protection. Perimeter
defense can be especially important against terrorist
attack
.
Protection o-f speci-fic structures and perimeter
defense are both important, but the designer must not
-forget to protect utility systems. Utilities,
especially water and power, must be protected -from
destruction or disruption. Utility tunnels -facilitating
sewers, ventilation systems, etc., also have to be
-17-

designed so as not to afford a terrorist access to the
facility. There are many methods available to
accomplish structural, perimeter and utility protection.
2.4 How To Protect
"The White House today looks imprisoned
in its own ring o-f concrete. This does not
have to be. Good engineering and good
security are not mutually exclusive."
-Robert Messmer 1 "
Senior Vice President
Hellmuth, Obata and Kasssabaum, Inc .
Once the design team has determined what buildings,
or parts o-f buildings, must be protected -from terrorist
acts, the next question that must be answered is how to
protect those -facilities. The type and amount o-f
physical security systems necessary must be determined.
Di-f-ferent options should be prepared and compared.
Deciding on what security options to use will then lead
into the actual design o-f the -facility.
The type and amount of protection used will be
dependent on several -factors, including the probability
of attack and method of attack and the cost of the
security system. The estimated cost of the loss
incurred from a terrorist attack, taking into account
the probability of an attack, must be weighed against
the estimated cost of providing necessary security.
This type of analysis, standard in almost any design,




-for protecting a -facility
against an attack are numerous. Speci-fic construction
methods and materials can harden a -facility. The
selection o-f the
-facility site is very important -from a
security standpoint. Perimeter defense involves
electronic measures,
-fences, barriers and guards.
Access to the
-facility can be controlled at the
perimeter by guards and barriers and at the structure by
guards and electronic identification or monitoring
systems.
All o-f the above options will be discussed in more
detail in the -following chapters.
2.5 Design Procedures
The -following is a summary o-f the design procedure
for a -facility where probability o-f terrorist attack is
high. Some speci-fics o-f some of the more unique design
steps were discussed above. Appendix D contains a
description of a program used for security design, the















-Determine what needs to be protected;
-Determine acceptaple losses;
-Develop initial security design;
-Determine cost estimates.
3. FINAL DESIGN:
-Determine -final security systems required to
meet the threat with the -funds available;
-Prepare -final drawings and specs;
-Develop schedules.
4. ADVERTISE AND AWARD CONTRACT
5. FOLLOW-UP:
-Check installation and operation o-f security
and integrated systems to ensure operability,
maintainability etc.
OVERALL GOAL OF DESIGN: Produce the best security system





3. 1 Layered De-fense
The -first line o-f de-fense -for most -facilities will
be its perimeter. There are a number o-f ways to protect
a -facility by protecting the exterior grounds around the
•facility. A layered de-fense, including siting
considerations, electronic measures, access control,
vehicle barriers and blast barriers, is probably the
best means o-f protecting a facility.
The objective o-f perimeter de-fense is to deter or
prevent an attacker -from reaching the critical -facility.
I-f a good perimeter security system is designed, the
facility may not require as much structural protection,
which can get expensive.
3.1.1 Site Selection
An important consideration in the design o-f a
secure -facility is its site selection. Planners should
keep security in mind as much as possible when
considering the site -for a possible terrorist target.
I-f the site location is dictated by Dther -factors, the
security engineer can possibly improve the site
conditions to make it more secure.
-21-

Considerations in the siting o-f the building
include the location o-f trees, streams, embankments,
etc. It is possible to use the terrain to help provide
perimeter security. For example, trees, embankments and
streams can act as vehicle barriers. However, natural
terrain can also aid the terrorist. For example, a
wooded area near a -facility can provide cover -for an
attacker. 1S
Location o-f the building or buildings within the
site is also important. The building should be located
as -far away -from the perimeter as possible. This will
aid in the design o-f exterior security and increase the
delay time o-f an attacker. It also allows -for a large
enough stand-o-f-f distance should a vehicle bomb explode
against a vehicle barrier. The building location can
also be in-fluenced by the natural terrain o-f the site.
The building should be observable by the security -forces
and guards that are protecting it. Thus, buildings
should not be located over hills or behind trees or
embankments that may obscure it -from view -from guards. 1 *
Terrain can there-fore work -for or against the
security o-f the building. The security engineer can
take advantage o-f certain site -features but must also
deal with those -features that may actually aid the






























Clear zones should also be provided around the
building or perimeter. Clear zones usually consist o-f a
20 to 100 -foot strip that is kept mowed and is cleared
o-f obstructions so that unusual activity around the
perimeter can be observed. In the Navy, clear zones are
required to be maintained. 11'
3.1.2 Access Control
Limiting access to a compound or building is one
e-f-fective means o-f reducing the threat. Access control
usually consists o-f issuing identification (ID) cards
and using guards to check the ID cards. Proper access
control that uses guards requires that the guards be
well trained in their duties and in spotting counterfeit
ID'S.
I-f guards are used to provide access control at
perimeter gates, design o-f the guardhouses, lights and
ingress/egress routes also become important. A lone
sentry standing out in the open is not much o-f a
deterrent to a terrorist and it is almost impossible -for
a single guard armed with a small weapon to stop a
speeding car. Placement o-f vehicle barriers can aid a
guard in slowing or stopping a vehicle. Instead o-f
entrance roads being straight, putting in curves can
slow a vehicle down significantly. The guardhouse
should be protected -from both small arms -fire and
-24-

ramming vehicles and it should be well lit. Many o-f the
structural security options discussed in this paper
should be considered
-for the guardhouses.
The importance o-f a trained and alert guard -force
cannot be over-emphasized. Even i-f the many electronic
countermeasures and detection devices are used, guards
are o-ften still a key element in the -facility's
de-fense. ie
Another means o-f providing access control is by
installing an electronic card control system. These
systems usually employ cards with magnetic coded strips
that are read by a special card reader. Access is then
automatically granted to the card holder. The major
fault with this system is that cards can be stolen.
Access is actually granted to the card, not to the
specific individual. Other electronic systems are being
developed which use unique individual characteristics,
such as -fingerprints, eye retinae, or even voice pattern
recognition, to grant access. 1 * These systems can be
used at perimeter entrances through gates or main
building or space entrances.
3.1.3 Fenc inq
Fencing will provide only a minor amount o-f
protection against a terrorist attack. Most types o-f
fences are easily broached by a wel 1 -equi pped terrorist.
However, -fencing, in combination with proper lighting,
-25-

clear zones, intrusion detection devices and guards, can
provide what could be a crucial period o-f delay time -for
an attacker.
Standard chain link -fences o-f-fer less than 2
minutes o-f penetration time (the time -for an average
intruder to create a man-sized opening). However, they
can be reinforced, or hardened, to o-f-fer the appearance
o-f greater resistance, thus becoming a deterrent.
Fences can be hardened with cables that are anchored to
strong posts, such as concrete posts. These cables can
provide a measure o-f protection -for a vehicle that may
try to crash through the -fence. The penetration
distance o-f such -fences has been measured by the Naval
Civil Engineering Laboratory (NCEL) at 7 to 26 -feet. a-r
However, i-f vehicle bombs are the threat, -fences are not
effective barriers. Vehicle barriers are discussed in
more detail in section 3.3.
The other options -for hardening -fences consist
mainly o-f di-f-ferent con-figurations of -fencing and barbed
wire. Many combinations o-f -fencing, barbed wire and
concertina (rolled) barbed tape are used, with the
barbed wire on top o-f the -fence or along the bottom, or
a combination o-f both (see -figure 3.2). Since standard
-fencing options will do little to stop a terrorist, the
-fence should be augmented with some other -form o-f
barrier, such as concrete bollards, ditches, streams,
-26-

walls, etc. Lighting and intrusion detection devices
can also augment
-fencing. The height o-f a -fence has
proven to add only a -few seconds to penetration time.
Fabric tie-downs can be used to discourage entrance by
going under the -fence.
3.1.4 Lighting
Lighting is important to physical security -for a
number o-f reasons. Many attacks occur at night under
the cover o-f darkness. Perimeter lighting can remove
most o-f the advantage o-f a nighttime attack. Many
intrusion detection devices, such as closed circuit
television (CCTV) systems, require proper lighting to be
e-f-fective. Guards and sentries need proper lighting in
order to correctly perform their duties.
The Military Handbook o-f Design Guidelines -for
Physical Security o-f Fixed Land-Based Facilities
(DM-13.1), lists several lighting specifications -for
different areas. The specifications list required foot
candles at ground level for areas such as entrances
(2.00 or 1.00 foot candles) and isolated fenced
boundaries (0.15 foot candles). The specifications also
list the width of lighted boundary for each type of
area. For example, isolated fence boundaries should be




Figure 3.2: Fencing Option*
(from Design Guidelines -for Physical Security o-f Fixed
Land-Based Facilities, pp. 135)
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Lighting can be provided by -fixed light -fixtures or
movable -fixtures (light trucks). The type o-f light used
should be based on the amount o-f light needed,
maintenance costs and operating (energy) costs.
Lighting should be placed in areas where it is most
needed to reduce the probability o-f attack -from a
relatively unprotected area or to eliminate shadows
where lone terrorists or small group may hide.
It should be noted that tests have shown that
lighting provides a deterrent only to the
unsophisticated and undedicated intruder. Thus,
lighting will not usually deter a terrorist. Also,
be-fore signi-ficant -funds are spent on lighting, a study
may be made on whether an attack at night is likely.
The threat analysis should answer that question.
Although the terrorist will normally strike during the
day in order to get the maximum shock value, it is very
possible that a terrorist bomb may be planted at night.
3. 2 Intrusion Detection Systems
Another method o-f countering a terrorist attack is
through the use o-f an integrated intrusion detection
system (IDS). Intrusion detection systems allow
detection o-f an intruder, such as a terrorist, early in
his attack. The objective o-f the IDS should be to
detect the intruder early enough -for the security -force
to take e-f-fective preemptive action. For this reason,
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the IDS must start with the perimeter, or even outside
the perimeter.
There are many types o-f intrusion detection systems.
Which type should be installed will depend on -factors
such as the type o-f threat, layout o-f the -facility, what
needs to be protected and how much the owner can a-f-ford.
IDS should be designed as a part o-f the total -facility
security system.
One o-f the simpler types o-f IDS is the taut-wira
detector. The taut wire detector is basically a trip
wire connected to an alarm. Taut-wire detectors can be
run along various points in a -fence and can detect an
intruder that may be attempting to climb over or under
the -fence or that may try to cut through the -fence.
They can also be used as trip-wires either just inside
or just outside the -fence.
Other sensors used in a similar manner as the
taut-wire are the tilt and vibration switch datactora.
These are switches that are set to close, and thus set
o-f-f an alarm, whenever they are tilted or vibrated.
These switches can detect movement along a -fence or by a
doorway. 22> 23
Other electromechanical systems include metallic
foil that is used on windows. This metallic -foil has a
current running through it that will set o-f-f an alarm
when the circuit is broken by an intruder breaking the
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window. Magnetic contact devices are used on doors,
windows and gates. These devices set o-f-f an alarm when
the contact is broken by opening the door or window.
Window lacing, or wooden screens with -fine wires running
through the slats, can be made to look like normal
window shutters but will set o-f-f an alarm i-f the wires
are broken during an entry attempt.
Electromechanical devices have several dis-
advantages, most important being their ease o-f detection
by an experienced intruder. More sophisticated devices,
including microwave, electric or magnetic -fields,
in-frared and CCTv", have become increasingly popular.
In microwave sensors, microwave energy is
continuously beamed -from transmitter to receiver. An
alarm goes o-f-f whenever the -field is broken or
de-flected. In-frared beam sensors work in a similar
manner using an in-frared light beam.
Electric -field and electric capacitance sensors
measure changes in electric -fields or electrical
capacitance and will sound an alarm when the
measurements change a specified amount. These sensors
are normally used to detect intruders who may be
attempting to climb over barriers or -fences.
Some buried-line sensors have been proven e-f-fective.
These include pressure sensitive buried-line and
magnetic buried-line sensors. The pressure sensitive
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lines are normally oil
-filled hoses with pressure
sensitive switches at the ends o-f the lines. Movement
over the lines causes pressure changes in the hoses. A
related device is the ••immic buried-line sensor, which
uses geophones to detect seismic vibrations -from
intruders walking over them. The magnetic buried-line
sensors can detect changes in the magnetic -field as an
intruder passes over them. This is sensitive to
ferromagnetic material and there-fore is use-ful -for
detecting individuals that may be carrying weapons.
Video motion detectors are used in conjunction with
CCTv" systems. These detectors sound an alarm when the
electrons moving into the -field o-f view are excited due
to movement detected by the CCTV camera. 24
Other intrusion detection systems are availabe on
the market. These include pressure sensitive mats,
audio detection systems, photoelectric devices and
vibration detectors.
All o-f the above detectors have their advantages and
disadvantages. Some are susceptible to -false alarms
from such things as large animals, lightning and wind or
their e-f -f ect i veness may be reduced by weather conditions
such as -fog (in the case o-f in-frared and photoelectric
devices). However, in a high threat -facility,
especially one which may be subject to terrorism, no one
intrusion detection system should be relied upon.
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Rather, a de-f ense-i n-depth concept should be employed
where several IDS systems are employed in succession.
This can reduce
-false alarms along with increasing the
detection probability. A terrorist may neutralize one
system and still be detected by another. By using IDS
in conjuction with barriers, access control, facility




3. 3 Vehicle Barriers
The car bomb: fast, effective, deadly. In 1983, it
was a car bomb that drove through the perimeter of the
U.S. Marine barracks, exploded with over 12,000 pounds
of TNT and killed 241 U.S. military personnel. From
January 1980 to March 1986, there were 13 car bomb
attacks against overseas U.S. Government facilities. 2*
The car bomb is one of the most popular terrorist
weapons in use today. The need to design effective
means of stopping this threat is evident.
3.3.1 General Considerations
The primary objective of a vehicle barrier is to
stop a vehicle from entering the compound. Some
barriers may be meant to only slow a vehicle down,
allowing sufficient reaction time to minimize injury and
damage. There are many considerations a designer must
take into account when deciding whether or not to




First, as in the design o-f any security system, the
threat must be determined. The type of vehicle bomb and
probability o-f attack should be estimated. The size and
speed o-f the vehicle should also be estimated. The
possible locations o-f entry o-f car bombs should be
determined and the criticality and vulnerability o-f each
entry point should be examined.
The probable size and speed o-f the car bomb is one
o-f the most important -factors in designing the proper-
vehicle barrier. A common method o-f evaluating the
performance o-f vehicle barriers is in terms o-f the
penetration it allows o-f certain weight vehicles with
speci-fic speeds. The Department o-f State lists the
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Vehicle speed can be estimated using -figure 3-3 -for
a passenger car or 2.5 ton truck. This -figure is based
on an assumed acceleration
-from a standing start o-f
11.27 -feet per second -for the passenger car and 5.80
-feet per second
-for the truck. The -following -formula
can be used to estimate the speed -for other conditions
i-f the acceleration is known:
\Mmph) - 0.66 <2»*>»-»
Where: s = distance (-feet)
a = acceleration (-ft/sec 2 )
Curves in a road leading to a vehicle barrier can
also slow a vehicle down. Figure 3-3 shows at what
speeds a vehicle will normally start to skid based on
the turning radius o-f the curve. This curve is based on
the -following -formula:
R « Vz /14.96
Where: R = curve radius (-ft)
V = speed (mph)
It is there-fore evident that the size and speed o-f
the vehicle should be estimated accurately. Also, roads
leading into the protected area should be curved
whenever possible. Any other method that may be used to
slow vehicles down prior to reaching the gate will also
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Figure 3.4: Turning Radius




-factors that will in-fluence vehicle barrier
design include aesthetics, the space available, whether
or not a guard or sentry is stationed at the gate,
reliability, maintainability and sa-fety. Vehicle
barriers are on the market that are hidden -from view
until activated, which is good -from an aesthetics
viewpoint, but they also require someone to operate
them. Using planters as vehicle barriers can provide
cover -for terrorists. A disasterous example o-f this
occurred when the American embassey in Saigon was
attacked in January 1968. Viet Cong terrorists had
managed to blast their way into the embassy compound and
held onto the grounds, though not the embassy itsel-f, by
using concrete planter boxes as cover -from which they
could -fire. 2*
Vehicle barriers should be located at probable
attack sites. Another -factor to consider in deciding
their location, however, is the proximity o-f the
building to be protected. Su-f-ficient separation distance
should be designed so as to minimize damage -from the
shock o-f a car bomb explosion upon contact with the
barrier. Using the Navy criteria o-f 1000 pounds o-f
explosive, structures within a 400 -foot radius could
receive light to heavy damage -from the blast. I-f
su-f-ficient clear distance cannot be provided, the
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facility may have to be hardened or blast walls
i nstal led.
Often, kinetic energy is used to compare the
effectiveness of vehicle barriers. Kinetic energy can
be expressed by the -following
-formula -for vehicle crash
threats:
KE - 33.44 x 10~»(wv2 )
Where: KE = kinetic energy (-foot-pounds)
w = vehicle weight (pounds)
v = vehicle speed (mph)
There-fore, i-f a vehicle weighs 10,000 and impacts the
barrier at 40mph, the resultant kinetic energy is
535,040 -foot-pounds. Any barrier that can withstand
that -force is adequate -for the threat. a *
The entrance to a protected -facility could be
divided into three zones -for design. The -first zone
would be the approach and would consist o-f designs used
to slow vehicles down, such as curves and speed bumps.
The approach zone would vary in length and would connect
the checkpoint (guardhouse or gate) with the public
road. The second zone, the blast zone, is at least 400
feet long and is between the guardhouse and the barrier.
This zone provides safety for the sentries and time for
an active barrier system to be activated. The third
zone, the safety zone, provides space between the
structure to be protected and the barrier. It should be
at least 900 feet for an explosion of 10,000 pounds TNT.
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Blast barriers may be installed in this zone i-f adequate
distance is not available. 32
3.3.2 Vehicle Barrier Types
There are two categories o-f vehicle barriers,
passive and active. Passive barriers do not need to be
activated in any way. Active barriers require action by
personnel or equipment to deploy and thus selectively
permit entry. Active barriers normally require a power
source to operate and are activated automatically by
trips or sensors or manually by sentries or security
personnel using remote switches. A brie-f discussion o-f
several types o-f passive and active systems -follows:
3.3.2.1 Passive Vehicle Barriers
Passive barriers are simple and inexpensive,
but they are limited in their use and e-f -f ect i veness.
Passive barriers can be -fixed structures, such as walls,
bollards, ditches, lakes or streams, guardrails and
others. They can also be movable, such as logs,
boulders, curbs or highway medians. Each has advantages
and disadvantages. Some o-f the more popular passive
systems are described below:
Concrete barriers, especially the New Jersey highway
median barrier, are normally inexpensive and may be
-fixed or relatively mobile (they can be placed in
position within a small amount o-f time i-f the proper
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equipment is available). They are relatively e-f-fective
at small impact angles (less than 30 degrees). Full
penetration can be achieved, however, by a light
vehicle, but not without damage. Tests resulted in a
4000 pound vehicle at 50 mph penetrating 20 -feet with
extensive damage to the vehicle and probable serious
injuries to the occupants. A summary o-f test results o-f
many barriers, as conducted by the Naval Civil
Engineering Laboratory, are given in Appendix A.
Concrete bollards are a -fixed system o-f 8 inch
diameter steel pipe (1/2 inch thick) -filled with
concrete. They normally extend 3 -feet above ground and
have a 4 -foot deep -footing. This system is e-f-fective as
a backup system to a -fence to stop vehicles that may
attempt to crash through the -fence. They can also be
used to direct tra-f-fic and prevent vehicles -from
crossing -fields to reach sensitive structures, thus
bypassing the main roads.
Concrete planters can be used as vehicle barriers
and they are aethset ical ly pleasing. Their
e-f -feet iveness as vehicle barriers is good (a 15,000
pound vehicle at 47 mph penetrated 31.2 -feet). However,
as already mentioned, care must be taken not to provide
an attacker the cover that a planter might provide.
Fences can be used as vehicle barriers i-f they are
rein-forced su-f -f ic ient ly with concrete and cables.
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However, even rein-forced, they are not normally
considered adequate to -function as vehicle barriers
alone. Cable rein-forced
-fencing has proven capable o-f
stopping vehicles (see Appendix A).
Ditches and earth barriers can be very e-f-fective
vehicle barriers to use around the perimeter of a
-facility. Sand -filled drums, curbs, logs and similar
barriers are used most o-ften to direct tra-f-fic or to
slow a vehicle down. Sand -filled 55 gallon drums can
e-f -f ect i vely stop a vehicle i -f enough o-f them are used to
absorb the vehicle's kinetic energy.
It should be noted that concrete and masonry walls
are generally not considered use-ful as vehicle barriers.
Tests on these walls have shown that -full penetration
was achieved.
There are many other type o-f passive barriers
available. Some are available on the commercial market,
others, such as ditches and logs, can normally be
constructed using local equipment and material. Even
heavy equipment tires hal-f buried in the ground can stop
light vehicles. When considering passive vehicle
barriers, aesthetics, cost and e-f -feet iveness must be
taken into account. 33
3.3.2.2 Active Vehicle Barriers
Passive vehicle barrier systems have several
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disadvantages. The time involved in getting some o-f
them into position is one. They cannot be used to block
a road as that would also prevent authorized vehicles
from passing through. In order to allow -for selective
vehicle access, many di-f-ferent types o-f active systems
are avai lable.
When selecting active systems, the means -for
activating the system is important. The active systems
can generally be activated by buttons or switches -from
the guardhouse but they can also be set to operate
automatically i-f necessary. Some systems, such as mines
in the roadway, can be command controlled. All systems
should have a back-up means o-f control. Guards in a
guardhouse should be able to activate the system even i-f
wounded. I-f an automatic system -fails, there should be
a method o-f activating it remotely.
There are many types o-f active barriers. A -few o-f
the more common barriers are described below:
The Babcock and Wilcox Arr»»tor (see -figure 3.5) is
a system that uses pointed steel beams that are operated
pneumatically to stop a vehicle. It has been -found to
be very e-f-fective. When lowered, the system is flush
with the roadway and vehicles can pass over it. When










Figure 3.5: Bibcock and Wilcox Arr*«tor
(from Terrorist Vehicle Surv ivabi I i ty Manual,
March 1986, p. 7-2)
Barricade systems are normally hydraul ical ly
operated units that use steel or concrete barricades to
stop the vehicle. These units can come in a variety o-f
sizes and shapes. For example, the Dalta TT2078 Phalanx
(figure 3.6) system rises to a height of 38 inches. A
test vehicle o-f 14,815 pounds at 49.9 mph p<?netr^ted 3.4
feet but was also totally destroyed.
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Figure 3.6: Delta TT207S Phalanx Vehicle Barrier
(from Terrorist Vehicle Bomb Survix/abi I i ty Manual
March 1986, p. 7-8)
The Delta TT120 Hydraulic Bollard System consists of
a 10 inch diameter steel bollard that is vertically
raised into position. A 15,180 pound vehicle at 30 mph
penetrated the barrier 2.4 feet.
The Entwistle Dragnet system uses a chain link net
attached to metal tape that is drawn through energy
absorbers to stop vehicles. The energy absorbing device
acts as a brake that slows down and eventual stops the
vehicle. The net system is held in an elevated
position, allowing authorized vehicles to pass
underneath, until deployed. To stop heavy, -fast moving
vehicles, a second net located at some distance beyond
the -first may be needed. The single net system allows
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penetrations o-f up to 50
-feet.
The Western Portapungi (see -figure 3.7) is a
barrier designed to immobilize a vehicle by engaging the
front axle. It is very mobile, installation time being
only minutes, and there-fore can be moved ^om point to
poi nt
.
Figure 3.7: Western Portapungi Vehicle Barrier System
(from Design Guide I ines -for Physical Security o-f Fixed
Land- Based Faci I i t ies, p. 224)
There are many other types o-f active barrier systems
and new types are being tested. Anti-driver devices
include bright lights set to shine in the driver's eyes,
ant i -personnel chemical agent dispensers and visibility
reducing -fog dispensers. Active barriers that -force
vehicles o-f-f the road into a swamp, ditch or other
hazard are also possibilities. Using reverse banked
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curves with -friction reducing agent dispensers is
another possibility. Pits that are normally covered by
a ramp, which drops upon activation, are another type o-f
active barrier system. It should be noted that tire
shredders are popular vehicle barriers but their
e-f feet iveness is limited. A determined terrorist will
drive right through tire shredders and just keep on
going to his objective. Also, barriers that threaten
the occupants with death but do not stop the vehicle may
be i ne-f -f ect i ve against suicide bombers.
Although active barriers allow selective access to
an installation, they are o-ften more expensive than
passive barriers. Active barriers also require more
maintenance than passive barriers. One other -factor to
keep in mind when selecting an active barrier is its
cycle time, how soon a-fter deployment can it be lowered
and how -fast will it deploy when activated. These can
be critical -factors in determining type and location o-f
the barriers. Most cycle times can be obtained -from the
manufacturer or -from tests made by other organizations,
such as NCEL. 3*
Other considerations include avoiding installing
underground active barriers i-f the installation cannot
be drained properly or i-f the ground is subject to
severe soil conditions such as -freeze/thaw e-f-fects. An
alternate tra-f-fic route should be available but should
-47-

not be usable unless needed. Active barriers normally
rely on power sources. These sources should be
protected and an emergency source o-f power should be
available to the vehicle barriers. The exits as well as
the entrances should be protected. Figure 3.8 shows the
general e-f
-f ect i veness o-f several types o-f vehicle
barriers. Appendix A lists penetration test results -for
many common vehicle barriers.
3.3.3 Vehicle Barrier Design
Figure 3.9 is a decision tree that will aid
the security engineer in the design o-f a vehicle barrier
system. Similar decision trees can be developed -for
other components o-f security design.
3. 4 Tunnel i ng
In some instances, a sophisticated attacker may
gain access to a -facility through tunneling. I-f the
tunneling threat is signi-f icant , the security engineer
must design measures into the -facility that will reduce
the threat. There are several means that can be taken
to de-fend against a tunneler. Rein-forcing the -floor
slabs will deny the intruder access to the building by
coming up through a tunnel. However, a terrorist may
still tunnel to the -floor in order to plant a bomb under
the -f aci 1 i ty.
To guard against any tunneling intrusion, motion
detectors such as seismic detectors, electrical
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capacitance detectors and others can be used to detect
tunneling activity. Underground barriers such as sheet
metal or buried -fence -fabric can be used to impede
tunneling i -f the threat warrants. Natural terrain
characteristics, including ditches, streams and trees
with deep root systems, can also inhibit tunneling.
Perhaps the best defense against a tunneler, however, is






























Figure 3.8:Barrier E-f -f ect iveness Chart









Figure 3.9: V»hicl» B*rri»r D»ci»ior. Tre»
(•from Terrorist Vehicle Bonb Survivability Manual,





4. 1 General Considerations
De-fense o-f the perimeter is important. However,
even a well designed perimeter de-fense is not
-f ool -proo-f
.
A sophisticated and dedicated terrorist
with modern weapons will probably -find a way through a
perimeter de-fense. The next question the security
engineer must address in his design is to what degree
the structure itsel-f must be hardened and what methods
of -facility hardening should be used. Again, there are
many -factors that must be taken into account.
As in the design o-f the perimeter, the threat is one
o-f the most important -factors to be considered when
designing the building to be protected. I-f the threat
is an organized group o-f terrorists with access to
explosive weapons, the -facility will have to be designed
to withstand direct hits by rockets or explosives. If
the threat is a lone intruder, then protection -from
small arms and intrusion may be all that is necessary.
Whatever the expected threat, the -facility should be
built to survive an attack.
Another consideration is whether or not any loss is
acceptable. The cost to -fortify a building against
direct rocket attack, -for example, may be prohibitive.
-52-

There-fore, the owner and designer may decide that the
loss o-f parts o-f the building is acceptable and
there-fore only certain sections o-f the -facility may be
hardened against attack. An interior vault or speci-fic
interior rooms may be heavily protected while the
exterior portions o-f the structure are constructed o-f
standard building materials. Only protecting what needs
to be protected can save -funds that may otherwise be
spent unnecessarily. Cost versus loss is an important
design parameter -for the security engineer.
In deciding the degree o-f hardening necessary to
adequately protect the structure, the perimeter defense
should be taken into account. A strong perimeter
de-fense along with su-f-ficient clear zones and sa-fety
zones may reduce the amount o-f -facility hardening
required. For example, i-f the vehicle barriers must be
located too close to the structure, even i-f the vehicle
is stopped, shock waves -from the ensuing explosion could
severely damage a structure. In that case, the
structure would have to be protected by additional
hardening or by such things as blast walls. Appendix B
contains examples o-f the pressures that structures




4. 2 Construction Options
When designing a -facility to resist a terrorist
attack, several options are available to the engineer.
The two most important aspects are the choice of
materials used and the dimensions o-f walls, roofs and
floors, as well as the building geometry. In general,
the normal design procedures used to design structures
should be -followed by the security engineer only with
the additional forces that may be added due to a direct
hit or to a proximity explosion. These additional
-forces can be calculated once the probable threat is
known
.
4.2.1 Wall and Roo-f Construction
In the design o-f walls and roofs that may be
subject to ballistic or explosive attack, reinforced
concrete has proven to be the only effective
conventional material for attack-hardened facilities.
The hardening options for reinforced concrete walls and
roofs (and floors of multi-story buildings), include
increasing the thickness of the wall, increasing the
reinforcing steel (increasing the reinforcement bar size
or number of layers), or decreasing the reinforcement
bar spacing.
Another hardening option for reinforced concrete is
to use steel -f iber-reinf orced concrete. The fibrous
concrete adds significantly to the penetration time of a
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wall against an intruder trying to gain entrance through
the wall. However, rein-forced -fibrous concrete is also
more expensive than conventional concrete.
There are many more options for the construction of
walls, including masonry walls (concrete masonry units),
and stud/grit walls. However, even with rein-forcing
options available to these walls, they are generally
inadequate -for protection against terrorist attack. One
other hardening option is to use composite materials. A
layered system o-f steel /polycarbonate panels o-f-fer
penetration resistance and are use-full -for retro-fitting
existing structures.
4.2.2 Blast Barriers
Current technology -for protecting buildings -from
blast loading involves heavy reinforcement o-f exterior
concrete walls as described above. These walls are
normally cast integrally with heavily rein-forced -floors
and columns. Windows must be thick and small in order
to resist the blast loads. This type o-f design can be
expensive to construct, especially in areas where
materials and skilled labor may not be readily
available. The walls and components such as windows and
doors may be subject to local -failure which could allow
deadly shrapnel to enter the building even i-f the wall
itsel-f was strong enough to resist the blast. These
walls are expensive to repair i-f damaged by a blast.
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Designing buildings using heavy reinforcement often
results in a -fortress- 1 ike appearance.
The many disadvantages o-f current rein-forced
concrete design -for protection against blast loads have
led to newer technologies that eliminate some o-f the
disadvantages. One o-f these new methods that is
currently being developed is the "blast barrier."
The blast barrier is a wall section that relies on
•friction to absorb the energy o-f a blast wave. Wall
panels are constructed o-f conventional materials such as
precast concrete or masonry block. The wall panels are
mounted on tracks that extend about two -feet into the
building. When hit with a blast load, the wall panel
will slide along the tracks dissipating the blast energy
and avoiding collapse. Since the wall does not have to
be built to withstand the -full blast load, it is less
costly than the standard monolithic walls and columns.
The blast barrier has an approximate cost savings o-f 13%
over the conventional construction system. The savings
is due to less materials, concrete and reinforcing
steel, required and simplified construct ion. 3S
The blast barrier system is based on the conversion
of the blast impulse energy into kinetic energy of the
wall. This kinetic energy is then dissipated through
friction brake shoes as the wall slides into the
building along its shallow tracks. The wall will only
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move when the minimum blast barrier pressure is exceeded
by a blast loading. The minimum blast barrier pressure
can be calculated as -follows:
Pbb uN/A
Where: Pbb = minimum blast barrier pressure;
u = coe-f -f icient o-f -friction;
N = the total in-track prestress -force;
A = area o-f wall exposed to blast.
The total in-track prestress -force is adjustable,
thus the minimum blast barrier pressure is also
adjustable. The displacement o-f the wall subject to
certain blast pressures above the minimum blast pressure
can be controlled by proper design o-f the weight o-f the
wall, the prestress -force or the coe-f icient o-f -friction.
Figure 4.1 shows a typical detail o-f a blast barrier
window wall. The tracks are embedded in the sides o-f
columns, -floors and ceilings -formed with a reusable
rigid template. A steel bar in the tracks is used to
align the precast walls accurately. The steel bars -fit
through te-flon sleeves in the wall panels. The slide
plates can then be prestressed using a load cell to
compress the wall against each track. This determines
the prestressed -force, N, which then determines the
reaction -force necessary to cause movement o-f the wall
as described above (see -figure 4.2).
-57-

The minimum blast barrier pressure should be
designed to be well below the strength o-f the wall
itsel-f. Any blast pressure exceeding the minimum
pressure will then cause the wall to accelerate into the
building, dissipating the blast pressure until stopping
several inches inside the building. Thus the wall panel
itsel-f is not damaged. To repair the wall after the
blast, it is simply necessary to jack it back into
position and prestressing it again into the tracks.
SAMPLE BLAST ATTENUATION CALCULATION
4 PSI RESISTING FRICTION
- 100 > 100 SO IN IS . I |
• 10 000 > 4 > 20 TONS
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Figure 4.1: Typical Detail -for a Blast Barrier Wall













(a) Section of Building (b) Detail of Sliding Area
Figure 4.2: Mathematical Model o-f Blast Barrier
(from M.S. Caspe, "The Blast Barrier," p. 101)
The blast barrier o-f-fers not only cost advantages,
but it also o-f-fers more architectural -freedom by
allowing the use o-f any locally available materials.
The windows, door and wall have to be designed only to
meet the reaction -force, with an appropriate -factor o-f
sa-fety, and not the -full -force o-f the blast. Thus the
windows can be designed tD be larger and thinner. The
lower the strength o-f the wall materials, however, the
further the wall will have to travel into the building.
The blast barrier can be very use-ful i-f space
limitations prohibit proper clear zones between a
building and its perimeter defenses.
Since the blast pressure is not necessarily uniform,
a sa-fety -factor should be used to prevent local spalling
o-f the concrete which could result in shrapnel being
expelled into the building. This will result in
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slightly more rei n-f orcement than would otherwise have
been necessary. The blast barrier may also be used to
retro-fit existing buildings by adding a -facade 5 to 20
feet -from the existing exterior wall. This could add
more -floor space to the building.
The blast barrier can also be designed as a
perimeter wall system. In this capacity, the blast
barrier will absorb the impact o-f a vehicle and the
blast o-f a vehicle bomb. Properly designed, the blast
barrier will eliminate problems associated with
conventional concrete perimeter walls, including
shrapnel hazards and the probability o-f the vehicle
rolling over the barrier and exploding on the inside o-f
the perimeter.
The perimeter blast barrier system is constructed by
bolting portable 3x8x32 inch long steel boxes together
with horizontal and vertical bolts that can be
pretensioned to control -frictional slippage between
boxes. The boxes may be -filled with sand and rein-forced
with a cable (see -figure 4.3). The pretensioned -forces
determine at what -force the boxes will begin to slide
against one another and the -friction between boxes plus
additional viscous damping provided by the cable will
dissipate the energy o-f the vehicle and lesson the
e-f-fects o-f the blast pressure. The perimeter wall will
distort vice rupture. The wall could be covered with an
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architectural treatment. The components are easy to
transport and erect. Repair o-f the wall simply involves
replacing boxes that are severely damaged and
re-erecting those that are not badly distorted. 3*
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"L" indicates a dry-lubricant
coated surface
Figure 4.3: Perimeter Blast Barrier System
(from M.S. Caspe, "The Blast Barrier", p. 102)
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The blast barrier system is a viable alternative to
conventional rein-forced concrete that can result in
signi-ficant cost savings without sacrificing any
protection. As technology and research continues, more
e-f-ficient building systems that are blast resistant will
be developed. For example, a system similar to blast
barriers is being studied -for protection o-f roo-fs. This
system would provide a sacri-ficial roo-f over the
permanent structure. The sacri-ficial roo-f would be
designed to detonate and attenuate bomb blasts.
4.2.3 Window Treatment
Many o-f the injuries resulting -from terrorist
bombings and accidental explosions are caused by the
fragments o-f blasted-out window glazing. I-f windows are
not adequately protected against blast loadings, they
can also subject the occupants to blast pressures,
secondary debris and other blast e-f-fects. Providing
blast resistant windows in high risk -facilities is a
necessity in order to adequately protect the occupants.
Acceptable materials -for resistance to blast
overpressures include monolithic thermally tempered
glass, laminated thermally termpered glass and laminated
Herculite II (chemically tempered glass). Unacceptable
materials -for blast resistance include chemically
tempered glass (other than Herculite II) 5 annealed
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glass, heat-treated semi temper ed glass, wire-rein-forced
glass and acrylic (Plexiglass or Lucite). Polycarbonate
materials are still being tested. 3"
The acceptable materials should be used -for design
o-f structures that are to be blast resistant. The Naval
Civil Engineering Laboratory has developed design
procedures -for determing the required thickness o-f the
glazing based on threat (charge weight) and aspect ratio
(ratio o-f long side to short side o-f the window). The
tables used -for this design procedure are published in
the March 1986 edition o-f Terrorist Vehicle Bomb
Survivabi I i ty Manual and the Design Guide I ines -for
Physical Security o-f Fixed Land- Based Facilities.
I-f bomb -fragments are a concern in the design o-f
particular windows, a polycarbonate -fragment retention
film should be applied to the inside o-f the window tD
hold the glass in place. These -films are available
commercially. The recommended thickness o-f the -film is
1/2 inch. This -film has been -found to be e-f-fective in
short duration, small, close-in explosions but not as
e-f-fective in longer duration explosions. 3®
The windows need not be designed to be any stronger
than the surrounding wall and -frame. Frame design is
another important consideration -for designing windows.
Window -frame loading as transmitted by the blast and
window glazing is shown in -figure 4.4. The line loads
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and corner loads have been reduced to a static
structural design problem with the coe-f -f ic ients o-f C*,
Cy , C,- and the structural equivalent design load, r^.
These coe-f -f ic ients are tabulated in the two publications
previously mentioned.
The maximum stress limitations -for metal -frame
members are as -follows:
--fy/1.65
-for -frame members where -f>, is the
static yield stress -for the material as
listed in its spec i-f icat ions.
--fy/2.00 -for any -fastener.
-de-flection o-f -frame is limited to l/264th
o-f the span o-f the supported glass.
Examples o-f the tables used -for design o-f window
glazing and -frame loadings are given in Appendix C.
Windows may be protected by other methods. Metal
window barriers may be installed, though these have the
disadvantage o-f requiring advance warning o-f an attack
in order to be closed be-fore the attack occurs. Metal
bars and grates and intrusion detection devices can be
added to windows tD delay a lone intruder. Windows can
be slanted to de-flect bullets that may be -fired -from
assassins. Most window treatments will not stop a
bullet -from a high-powered weapon but can de-flect the
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Figure 4.4: Distribution o-f Lateral Load on Frame
(Terrorist Vehicle Bomb Survivability Manual, p.B-5)
4.3 Utilities
I-f a terrorist wishes to disrupt a facility's
operations, one method that may be used is to attack the
facility's utilities. Protecting the utilities of the
facility is o-ften neglected and some utilities are
easily disrupted by an experienced terrorist.
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Vulnerable utilities include electricity, water supply,
communication lines, steam, gas and even wastewater
out-flows. All utility outages will cause discom-fort at
the least. Some, such as a total power outage, could be
d isasterous.
Perhaps the most important utility -for the majority
o-f most -facilities is electrical power. Disruption o-f
electrical power can cause disruption o-f many other
utilities that depend on electricity -for operation.
Protecting the electrical power -from generation through
distribution to end use is there-fore very important and
must be considered during any security review or design.
Designing a secure electrical system is not an easy
task, especially -for -facilities that rely on outside
sources such as power companies and host countries. A
well trained terrorist will attack the weakest link in
the utility system. The actual generation o-f power is
normally relatively sa-fe as most power plants would
require a -full scale attack to cause severe damage.
However, there are many transmission and distribution
points which could be hit that may cause power
d isrupt ion
.
There are many methods o-f protecting the power
system. Redundant substations and alternate -feeds are
the most common type o-f protection. Redundancy provides
an alternate route should a terrorist eliminate one
route. Redundancy also provides -for easier maintenance
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o-f the system and a wel 1 -mai ntai ned system is less
vulnerable than a deteriorating system. When providing
alternate -feed lines, they must be physically separated
enough to make it impossible to knock out both -feed
systems with one blow (e.g., do not put both power lines
on the same utility poles).
Another -form o-f protection is to put the
distribution lines underground. Although this will help
to protect the lines, the above ground -features are
easily identi-fied and may be targeted. Substations
and overhead/underground transition points are still
vulnerable. These points must be protected using
physical security means and redundancy. Substations and
other vulnerable points should be well lit and enclosed
at least with -fences with barbed wire outriggers.
Locating the substations within other protected areas,
such as inside the -facility's perimeter, could make it
less vulnerable. Installing remote intrusion detection
devices could alert personnel to the possibility o-f an
attack in progress. Using a number o-f di-f-ferent
barriers that an attacker would have to get through is a
delaying tactic that can help de-feat a terrorist attack.
In spite o-f protective measures taken to prevent an
attack on electrical distribution systems, they usually
remain more vulnerable than the -facility itsel-f. Once
electrical power is knocked out, the -facility then
becomes an easier target. The loss o-f electrical power
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could cause computer systems, lighting, intrusion
detection systems and even some active vehicle barriers
to -Fail. There-fore, the importance o-f a source o-f
emergency power becomes evident. Emergency generators
o-f su-f-ficient size and number to supply power to all
critical operations and utilities should be available to
rapidly respond to a power outage. The design team will
need to determine which circuits should be on the
emergency power circuit. Only critical items should be
on the emergency circuit, such as lights, IDS,
communications, etc. Fixed generators with automatic
switching are pre-ferable but portable generators can
also be used. When portable generators are the source
o-f emergency power, the -facility should be equipped with
quick-connect -features to minimize the time the -facility
may be without power while hooUing up the generators.
Security and other sensitive systems should also be
equipped with back-up battery power. 3*
The vulnerability o-f other utility systems should be
examined and protection provided where necessary. The
Naval Facilities Engineering Command publishes a Utility
Systems Vulnerabi I i ty Assessment Guide that can be used
to identi-fy key components o-f an utility system and to
assess their vulnerability.
Communication systems should be protected in much
the same manner as electrical systems. Again,
redundancy and emergency power are key. The -facility
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should have more than one means o-f communication with
more than one communication line to and -from the
building. A back-up battery powered radio link should
also be available in case the terrorist is able to cut
o-f-f all other communication routes.
Water supply systems are vulnerable not only to
disruption but also to poisoning. Denying access as
much as possible to the water distribution system and
continually testing the water -for quality and
contaminants are the only protection means available.
Again, having an emergency source o-f water could be
important -for those -facilities that are isolated and
could be put under siege, as many embassies could be.
Steam, gas and compressed air systems should also be
protected similar to electrical power. Though these
systems are o-ften not vital to operations, they should
be assessed -for vulnerability and provided protection
where necessary.
Another -feature o-f some utility systems that must be
taken into account is whether or not that system may
provide access to the -facility -for an intruder. Steam
tunnels, -for example, could possibly o-f-fer an access
route to an experienced intruder. Other utility
openings in a building may provide easy access to the
lone terrorist who wishes to plant a bomb. These
openings should be made non-passable by covering the
openings with gratings or -filling them with smaller size
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"The principles -for thwarting terrorist
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5. 1 Summary
The design problem -facing the security engineer
today is a complicated one. I-f the design o-f a secure
-facility takes on the appearances o-f a prison or
•fortress, a small victory -for the terrorists is won.
Possibilities exist -for making -facilities and people
safe -from terrorism without restricting the civil
liberties granted by a democratic society and without
engendering a -fortress mentality. The securitiy
engineer must evaluate all the resources available to
him to design a safe, -functional and architecturally
pleasing -facility.
The problem o-f anti-terrorist engineering takes on
more complications as the threat becomes more
sophisticated, organized and armed with modern weapons.
Weapon technology is increasing steadily; security
technology must at least keep pace i-f security is to be
maintained. Small arms -fire has given way to
rocket-propelled grenades and car bombs loaded with
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thousands o-f pounds o-f explosives. The increased threat
means that designs -for secure -facilities will become
more complex and more expensive.
The beginning o-f the design process is determining
the threat. Deciding what can be protected and how to
protect it is the next important step. Many -factors
come into play and all o-f them need to be care-fully
evaluated and taken into account. Not the least o-f
these -factors is the budget. The amount o-f security
that can be provided cannot exceed the -funds available.
Security can be expensive so only those areas that
really need protection should be protected. Determining
acceptable losses versus the cost o-f protection (loss
versus cost -factors) will help the security engineer
focus his attention on the areas that need special
design. It is up to the security engineer to provide
the best security possible -for the money available.
The -first line o-f defense is the perimeter. I-f
terrorists can be denied access to their target, the
need to harden the target is lessoned and the chances o-f
a successful terrorist attack are reduced. The
perimeter can be protected in many ways including using
terrain -features, intrusion detection systems, guard
forces and vehicle barriers.
The next line o-f defense is hardening o-f the
structure itsel-f. Besides using conventional hardening
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methods, newer innovations such as blast barriers should
be considered. When hardening a -facility, the security
engineer must design security into the walls, roo-fs,
windows, doors and possibly even the -floors o-f the
-facility. Utilities must also be protected.
It should be noted that this paper has assumed that
an attack would be launched -from the ground. Attack by
air, a possible next step by terrorists as they are
thwarted in their normal attacks by better security
designs, pose special design problems. Also, -facilities
with water-fronts require special attention to avoid
waterborne attack or underwater attack.
The Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory (NCEL) has
taken the lead in physical security research among
government agencies. The advances being made at NCEL,
as well as other private and government organizations,
will bene-fit all concerned with providing a safe and
secure facility in the midst o-f rising terrorism.
5.2 Actions
The -following actions are considered necessary to
design a -facility that is relatively secure from
terrorist attack:
1. The threat analysis must be as accurate
and complete as possible. The remainder of
the security design will be based on this
analysis. Ensure that all concerned,
including law enforcement personnel and the




2. Complete a vulnerability assessment and
develop cost versus loss -factors. The
customer must be actively involved in
determining the acceptable losses.
3. Develop di-f-ferent options to provide
the necessary protection. Determine the cost,
advantages and disadvantages o-f each option.
4. Integrate the security design with
other systems. Fire protection, the-ft
protection and other systems can be integrated
into the design to complement each other.
This "total -facility control" concept can be
very advantageous in more complex structures.
5. Follow-up on the system design both
during and a-fter construction and
installation. This -follow-up will give
valuable data as to the maintainability,
operation and reliability o-f systems used.
Periodic updating o-f the system may be
necessary as the threat changes.
The above actions will not necessarily ensure a
terror ist-proo-f -facility, especially since there
probably is no such thing. However, they will enhance
security design and aid in constructing a safe -facility.
5.3 The Future
Terrorism is not going to disappear anytime in the
near -future. In -fact, terrorism will probably continue
to rise in -future years. Stemming the tide o-f terrorist
attacks will require the cooperation o-f all nations.
The lethality o-f the attacks will probably also rise as
kidnappings and disruption o-f operations continue to
lose their popularity to the more shocking bombings and
indiscriminate mass murders o-f innocents. Terrorists
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will continue to target the United States abroad and
domestic terrorism may also increase. Terrorism will
gain more modern weapons in the near -future and they
will not be unwilling to use them.
Terrorism, there-fore, will continue to provide the
need -for advances in security technology. The -future o-f
security engineering will see an increased role -for
computers, both -for design and threat simulation.
Electronic detection systems will be improved.
Defensive systems, such as laser systems, may be
developed -for use on structures. New construction
materials and systems such as the blast barrier will be
developed to protect -facilities.
Until terrorism can be reduced or eliminated, the
security engineer will be called upon to provide
protection as necessary -for government facilities and
private businesses overseas. It is a challenge that
will have be to met in order to save damage costs and to
save lives! Our -facilities should not be -fortresses,




VEHICLE BARRIER CRASH TESTS
Table A-l below summarizes the current data
available on vehicle crash tests as taken from the March
1986 Terrorist Vehicle Bonb Surv ix/abi I i ty Manuai (pp.
6-1 to 6-5). The current testing is being conducted
based on Navy and Department o-f State requirements. The
criteria may be greater than required -for some
installations. The installation should select a system
that meets the de-fined threat.











4,000 lb 50.0 mph 334.4 20 feet
Babcock & Wilcox
Arrestor







































PENETRATION 1BARRIER WEIGHT SPEED 1,000)
Delta TT203 15,000 lb 30.0 mph 451.4 No penetration
(Replaced by 10,000 lb 50.0 mph 836.0 No penetration
TT210)
Delta TT207, 6,000 lb 50.0 mph 501.6 2 7 feet
30 Inches High 18,000 lb 30.0 mph 541.7 29 feet (dump bed
only)
Delta TT207S, 14,815 lb 49.9 mph 1,233.6 0.75 foot
38 Inches High
Delta TT210, 15,180 lb 32.0 mph 513.6 12.2 feet
24-Inch Bollard 10,183 lb 40.0 mph 535.0 No penetration
Delta TT212 10,100 lb 17.0 mph 97.6 No pene trn t i on
Delta TT241, 6,000 lb 29.0 mph 168.7 82 feet
19 Inches High,
17 Inches Wide
Double Swing Gate 4,000 lb 50.0 mph 334.4 Full penetration
With Latch and
Cane Bolt
Dual Post, 4,500 lb 20.0 mph 60.2 Full penetration
5/8-Inch Cable
Dual Post, 4,500 lb 20.0 mph 60.2 2 feet
3/4-Inch Cable
Dual Post, 4,500 lb 39.0 mph 228.9 Full penetration
3/4-Inch Cable
Dual Post, 4,500 lb 47.0 mph 332.4 Full penetration
3/4-Inch Cable




8-Inch Bollard 15,000 lb 47.0 mph 1,108.0 No penetration
System
Entwistle Dragnet 1,460 lb 42.0 mph 86.1 10.2 feet





















































































































PENETRATION1BARRIER WEIGHT SPEED 1,000)
Twin T-Beam Wall 3,000 Lb 42.5 mph 181.2 FulL penetration
Western Portapungi 14,980 Lb 39.8 mph 793.5 40 feet
FuLL penetration may mean the vehicle passed through the barrier and was stiLL
capable of movement and controL, as is the case of the chain-Link fence, or it may
mean that a major portion of the vehicle and/or its payLoad passed through thn
barrier, but the vehicle was essentially destroyed and incapable of control or self
movement. Actual test resuLts (many of which are summarized in chapters 7 and 8)
should be reviewed when definitive results are desired.





Table B-i shows peak pressures and durations -for
speci-fic charge weights (TNT equivalency) and stand-o-f-f
distances. The tables are -for both re-flected and
incident pressure. Windows and walls that are around a
corner -from the direction o-f an expected blast may be
designed -for incident pressures. Table B-l is taken
from the March 1983 NAVFAC DM 13.1 (pp. 289-291).
TABLE B-l : Pressures and Durations
o-f Speci-fied Bomb Threats
Charge Weight, W = 4,000 lbs (TNT Equivalency)
Stand-off
Distance
Reflected Pressure Incident Pressure























































Charge Weight, W = 1,000 lbs (TNT Equivalency)
Stand-off
Distance
Reflected Pi essure Incident P ressure
Peak Pressure Duration Peak Pressure Duration
R P T P T
(ft) Cpli) (msec) (psi) (msec)
50 140 5.7 41.5 6.9
75 43 10.5 16.7 12.3
100 23.4 15.3 9.4 17.0
125 14.9 18.8 6.4 20.5
150 10.3 22.3 4,7 23.8
200 6.4 26.5 3.0 28.6
300 3.7 30.2 1.7 34.1
500 1.7 37.6 0.80 43.7
Charge Weight, W 300 lbs (TNT Equivalency)
Stand-off
Distance
Reflected Pressure Incident Pressure
Peak Pressure Duration Peak Pressure Duration
R P T P T
(ft) (psi) (msec) (psi) Cmsec)
25 391.5 2.0 86.3 3.1
50 49.5 7.0 16.9 8.1
75 18.6 11.4 7.74 12.5
100 10.4 14.9 4.73 15.9
125 7.25 16.8 3.33 18.4
150 5.55 18.2 2.57 20.0
200 3.72 20.2 1.75 22.2
300 2.04 23.7 1.00 26.2




Charge Weight, W = 100 lbs (TNT Equivalency)
Stand-off
Distance
Reflected Pressure Incident Pressure




















































Charge Weight, W = 30 lbs (TNT Equivalency)
Stand-off
Distance
Reflected Pressure Incident Pressure























































Table C-l is an example o-f a table that can be used
to determine the thickness for laminated thermally
tempered glass. This table, and others -for different
charge weights and aspect ratios, can be -found in
Appendix B o-f the Terror ist Vehicle Bomb Survivability
Manual. To -find the required thickness, use- the proper
table -for charge weight and aspect ratio (4000 lbs and
1.25 respectively shown in table C-l). Enter the table
with the plate dimensions (inches) and go across to the
desired stand-o-f-f distance (-feet). Read the glazing
thickness in inches. Round up to normally manufactured
glazing thicknesses. Use next larger window dimensions
and next smaller stand-o-f-f distance i-f desired numbers




































































































































































































































Table C-2 lists the static -frame design load
factor, r^, as a -function o-f window dimensions and
stand-o-ff range. These tables are used in the same
manner as table C-l and are also -found in the Terrorist
Vehicle Bomb Survix/abi 1 i ty Manual. More cables are
available -for di-f-ferent charge weights and aspect
ratios. The -factor r u is then used to calculate
expected window loads as described in section 4.2.3.
TABLE C-2:Static Frame Design Load, rM (psi
)
STATIC FRAME DESIGN LOAD (PSI)





B A 50 75 100 125 150 200 300 500
12.000 12.000 1253.64 351.63 148.39 104.14 54.01 29.29 15.35 8.61
14.000 14.000 1246.98 349.39 143.98 104.08 52.67 28.52 14.85 8.59
16.000 16.000 1240.95 347.71 143.21 101.00 52.33 28.43 14.79 8.58
18.000 18.000 1232.52 346.41 142.61 100.77 52.26 28.22 14.74 8.48
20.000 20.000 1224.12 344.48 142.14 100.34 52.03 28.07 14.71 8.48
22.000 22.000 1217.27 342.50 141.49 99.99 51.68 27.95 14.63 8.41
24.000 24.000 1211.58 340.86 140.71 99.50 51.40 27.86 14.58 8.36
26.000 26.000 1201.01 339.13 140.06 99.09 51.16 27.69 14.54 8.37
28.000 28.000 1187.86 337.65 139.29 98.56 50.95 27.54 14.48 8.32
30.000 30.000 1174.88 335.49 138.82 98.27 50.77 27.42 14.45 8.23
32.000 32.000 1163.57 332.25 137.88 97.86 50.51 27.31 14.38 8.15
34.000 34.000 1152.21 329.14 136.73 97.51 50.08 27.09 14.31 8.08
36.000 36.000 1142.16 326.39 135.55 96.93 49.69 26.89 14.23 8.06
38.000 38.000 1131.93 323.48 134.35 96.16 49.27 26.66 14.15 8.00
40.000 40.000 1127.58 320.88 133.28 95.36 48.88 26.45 14.09 7.91
42.000 42.000 1124.04 318.53 132.31 94.64 48.46 26.21 14.03 7.87
44.000 44.000 1120.46 316.21 131.31 93.98 48.15 26.04 13.97 7.83
46.000 46.000 1117.55 314.66 130.40 93.29 47.79 25.84 13.90 7.82
48.000 48.000 1114.21 313.76 129.57 92.65 47.47 25.66 -13.87 7.79
50.000 50.000 1111.47 312.94 129.24 92.07 47.24 25.54 13.87 7.79
52.000 52.000 1108.63 312.19 128.84 91.53 47.09 25.50 13.84 7.76
54.000 54.000 1105.71 311.33 128.56 91.03 47.01 25.43 13.82 7.73
56.000 56.000 1103.00 310.69 128.21 90.82 46.88 25.37 13.80 7.73
58.000 58.000 1100.48 309.95 127.98 90.62 46.76 25.30 13.78 7.71




PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
D. 1 Introduct ion .
Computer applications are now being developed -for
security engineering. One such program that is being
developed by the Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory is
the Physical Security Requirements Assessment
Methodology (PSRAM) . PSRAM has been developed as a
design aid -for improving physical security at existing
naval bases and -for new construction.
PSRAM currently examines three alternatives -for
relative cost-e-f -f ect i vieness: structural hardening,
intrusion detection systems (IDS), and security
personnel. The most cost-e-f -feet ive mixture o-f these
alternatives is identified by PSRAM through a repetitive
iteration process. PSRAM allows two basic outputs, the
confidence o-f intercepting an intruder and the 25 year
li-fe cycle cost o-f the security system. PSRAM also
allows the user to evaluate a specified security system
or automatically search -for the most cost-e-f -feet ive
opt ion.
D. 2 Inputs
Inputs to PSRAM by the user include the layout o-f
the road network, descriptions o-f current -facilities
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(•facility numbers, perimeters in -feet and the
locations). This data is then stored on disk for use as
necessary. New inputs include the location of the new
facility under consideration, the perimeter of the
-facility that must be secured (in -feet), the design
threat, descriptions o-f any structural barriers and
descriptions o-f any IDS that may be included. Ranges
can be specified for the latter two items and PSRAM will
then find the most cost-effective IDS and hardening
opt ions.
PSRAM contains over 260 construction options for
structural hardening. Table D-i contains a sample of
some of the options. The costs listed in table D-l are
the default costs and are based on the McGraw-Hill
series of estimating manuals. Table D-2 shows IDS
sensor type options available in PSRAM and the
associated default costs. The user may design with or
without any of the type of sensors listed in Table D-2.
The user may also specify 25 year life cycle costs of
IDS or structural hardening in which case the default
costs will not be used.
The number and type of security guards can also be
inputted. If guards are not specified by the user,
PSRAM will search for the most CDst-ef f ect i ve guard mix,
either roving or fixed.
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Round bars 3/8" diameter.
Round bars 1/2" diameter.




16 gauge hollow metal.















Wood frame 1" TAG on 16" studs.
Wood frame 1" TAG over 1/2" plywood,
Stucco.
Reinforced concrete 12" thick.
Reinforced concrete 8" thick.
Reinforced concrete 6" thick.
concrete block 8" thick, filled
and reinforced.
Concrete block 8" thick, filled.
Concrete block 8" thick, hollow.
8" brick.
Reinforced concrete 12" thick,
24" earth cover.
Reinforced concrete 8" thick,
24" earth cover.






Wood frame 1" TAG over 1/2" plywood,
Reinforced concrete 12" thick.
Reinforced concrete 8" thick.
Reinforced concrete 6" thick.




























X-7 through X •''
P- 10 through [) I ?
0-10 throuqh D M












W-49 through W 51
W-64 through V r,$
W-66 through W r> ( <
W-69
R- 70 through R- 71
R-75 through !' - 76
R- 77 through l ! /''
R-80
N/A = Not Applicable
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Table D-3 shows the threat inputs that may be
speci-fied by the user. The user -first identi-fies the
level of attack tools the threat may use (table D-3).
The skill level then may also be rpecified as "skilled",
"skilled with tool penalty" (tools used require time to
set up or are bulky), "unskilled" and "unskilled with
tool penalty." The user also may input a penetration
opening size required, 96 square inches is nominal for
man-sized openings but if destruction of the facility is































































hand 1 power tools



















( In stable peace-
time environment-































'loss costs Include material replacement costs, operational downllae costs,
facility repair costs. Investigative costs, and deterent costs.




The PSRAM system will print outputs in several
forms. The options selected by PSRAM may be sorted by
minimum cost, maximum confidence o-f intercept or minimum
cost per confidence level ratio. The printouts will
include construction type, recommended sensors, the
confidence o-f intercept -for each building component
(walls, roofs, floors, doors and windows), the number
and type of guards and the system 25 year life cycle
cost. If the user is using the system to evaluate a
specific security system, a more detailed printout is
produced
.
D. 4 Example Printout
The following four pages contain a sample printout
of a PSRAM run. The building analyzed in this run is an
administration building to be constructed at the new
home port in Everett, Washington. The first pages show
some of the inputs that were included in this run. Note
that the threat level inputted was level 4 with a
"skilled" threat. No IDS sensors were used. Limits on
life-cycle cost were inputted only for the total cost.
The output was sorted by confidence of intercept.
The "X-Stt" (or cross-section number) columns shown on
the output refer to tables in the PSRAM users manual
that correlate the number to a particular type of
construction cross-section. For example, the 39 for
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wall cross-sections in the example printout can be -found
from table D-4 to be a 2x4" studs with 2" wood siding
wall, which is then described in more detail in table
D-5. The same procedure results in determining the
optimum construction options -for each building component
as determined by PSRAM. The example output also shows
the optimum mix o-f guards (in this case 3 roving guards)
and the total costs associated with each option.
D. 5 Summary
PSRAM is already being used to evaluate new
construction, as shown in the example printout. It
should save time, e-f + ort and money when designing secure
facilities. It is currently limited in its use in
several ways, but development o-f the program is
continuing and improvements are being made. For
example, it currently cannot handle options -for high
terrorist or military threat that include explosives.
However, a high threat submodel is being developed that
should eventually solve this limitation. PSRAM, and
other programs like it, will become invaluable to the
security engineer designing against a multitude o-f
threats with many options available.
(The material -for this appendix was taken -from "A
Computer System For Analyzing and Designing Physical
Security -for Naval Shore Facilities" an Executive
Summary by L.M. Pietrzak and G.A. Johanson, January
1986, prepared by the Mission Research Corporation)
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Figure D-2: PSRAM Output (Example)





SORTED ON HIGHES T CONFIDENCE OF INT ERCEPT SHELL CASE: EXT
I
W A L L
| R OO F | F 1, OR i D 1 ! I
_X-S* CI X-S* CI I x"-s#
1 I 3 9 100 |~~" 165 100 156 N/A I 209
2 1 39 100 | 165 100 I 1 56 N/A I 223
3 ! 33 56
_j_ 165 " 43 I .1.56 N/A j 223
4 j _ 39 56 | 1.65 43 ! 156 N/A i 209
5_L 3 9 I 165 i 1°- '•'! ! 2 23




ONLY. INTER IQR ~N QT C ONSIDERED.
~_ZZl.
TOTAL" 25~Y¥AR CONSTRUCTI ON SENSOR GUARJDS
LIF ECY CLE COST LJEECYCLE COST LIFECYCLE COST LIFECYCLE COST
14778 20 ~342503~ "~ _ Fl"3 5 3 1
"




11847 74" 1342503 842271
854933 305708 '_ .54922 '
891728" 342503 _0 ..._.. 549 2 2 \
SORTED ON HIGHEST CONFIDENCE OF INTERCEPT SHELL CAS E: EXTERIOR
MINIMUM CONFIDENCE kkkk CONFIDENCE OF INTERCEPT kkkkk
OPTION OF INTERCEPT IN TIME WALL ROOF FLOOR DOOR WINDOW
...
_
1 99 100 100 N/A 100 99
2 98 100 100 N/A 93
3 20 56 43 N/A




6 N / A
_
ONLY. INTERIOR NOT CONSIDERED. . ...
I
WINDOWS ! SENSORS | GUARDS
| x
- S * CI VIBRATION INT ER 1 R_ _E I X _R V
j T T A L
| i OST
|
' 201 ~~W ! ..... ° . 3
1
|_ .1.47 • !0
J_ 201 99 | j 9
j 1 44 10 25
| 2 1 2 | _ J - 4 |
J. .i. 4 1
201 20 1 L .9 2 j _ 1 1 8 4 7 1
201 ! _J f ' i j _854 l7 ! !




T»bl» D-4: Cro»s Sections Contained in P8RAM
(Example)








8'C0NC#4 "»• EACH FACE REPAF:
•» WALL J 7.76 8* #4 REBAR EVRY CRS MF
3 UALL '3 12.25 3' BRICK
4 UALL L 15.07 12"C0NCt6 12'EACHFACE REBAR
23 UALL L 14.02 B'CONC tA 6' REBAR
24 UALL I 19.47 12'C0NCt6 6'EACH FACE REBAR
23 UALL I 25.17 18*C0NC»6 6' 3 LAYERS REBAR
26 UALL I 31.47 24'C0NC»6 6* 4 LAYERS REBAR
27 UALL 1I 43.35 36'C0NCt6 6* 6 LAYERS REBAR
28 • UALL L 55.29 48'C0NCt8 6' 8 LAYERS REBAR
2? UALL 1L 20.69 12'C0NC*6 I6*y 6'H 5/16* EM
30 UALL 1I 22.28 13*C0NCt6 16*V 6'H 3/16* EM
31 UALL 1L 23.87 24'C0NC*6 16'V 6'H 5/16' EM
32 UALL 1 I 26.94 36'C0NCt6 16'V 6'H 5/16' EM
33 UALL 1 12.18 4'CONC #5 3' REBAR EACH UAY
34 uall :! 12.80 4'FIB CONC #5 5* REBAR
37 UALL 1L 13.28 3'CONC t5 3' REBAR
3? UALL i\ 6.16 2X4'STUDS 2'SIDING
42 UALL '1 13,33 l'BRK 8'CMU tSREBAR MORTAR
45 UALL 1L 11.82 8'CONC *6 12' REBAR
47 uall :S 13.64 3* CMU #8 REBAR MORTAR
48 UALL *) 14.63 8* CMU MORTAR 3' FIB CONC
4? UALL *1 13.36 3/VPLY l'FM EM 3' CMU
50 UALL '1 8.39 1' FOAM DMPL 3' CMU
51 UALL ' 16.64 4'BRICK 4'CMU 3/4'EM 4'CMU
52 UALL *1 11.27 3' CMU EXP METAL 4'CMU
53 UALL * 1 13.67 3'CMU UIRE FBRC 4'FERROCMNT
54 UALL < I 16.43 8'CMU 2 LINK FENCE EM FC
55 UALL 5' 13.36 BS F SHT 3TD GYP PLY SM
56 UALL 12.33 BS F SHT STD GYP PLY EM RL V
57 UALL / ' 17.03 BS F SHT STD GYP UUF FC
58 UALL iI 9.74 BS *15 FELT 1X6SHT 3/3'PLY
5? UALL L 12.67 3'CONC t3 6' REBAR
60 UALL 1I 10.60 8'C0NCt2 6' EACH FACE REPAF
61 UALL ? 10.64 GYP STD GYP SSTP MS
62 UALL ' 7.53 GYP STD GYP SSTD MS
72 UALL !5 17.81 10GA SM EM 1/2'FM 10GA SM
73 UALL i 20.12 10GA SM RM EM 1.8'OAK 1CGA
74 uall :1 13.23 1/4'SP 1 1/2'OAK 3'FM 10GA
75 UALL i 14.13 1/4'SP 20GA SM 3'FM l'PLY
96 UALL 3 3.64 8* CMU #3 REBAR
97 UALL 4 12.39 8* CMU 1/4* EXP METAL
98 UALL 4 8.29 8* CMU 1.5* PLYUOOD
go UALL 4 8.29 3* CMU 3/4' PLY MAT 3/4'PLY
110 UALL 1 16.36 4'CONC. STEELMESH 6X6X1/4'
111 UALL 1 11.57 4'CONC »S f>' REBAR EACH 'JAY
112 UALL 1 10.36 6'CONC M 8' REBAR EACH UAY
113 UALL 1 12.67 8'CONC »5 6" REBAR
114 UALL 1 14.02 3'CCNC *i 6" PEPAR
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m, mo. ABBREVIATION DESCRIPTION
"2 326 9GA SP 3/4-PLY 9GA SP
'3 227 9GA 90SMAT PLY 90#MAT 9GA
ASTM 607 HS. 9ga, <r-nz
plywood, 3/4", center
ASTM 607 HS, 9ga , back
ASTM 607 HS, 9ga , front
roof mat, 90# , 2nd
plywood, 3/4", 3rd
roo-f mat, 90* , 4th
ASTM 607 HS, 9ga, back
312 0.133" SP .5 PLEX SP PLEX SP ASTM A-607 stall , 0.
p 1 ex , 0.5, 2nd
ASTM A-607 still , 0.
plix, 0.3, *th
ASTM A-607 itail , 0.
73 31' 0.133" SP .3 LEX SP LEX SP
314 0.23 SS .3 PLEX SP
ASTM A-607 Kill , 0.
linan, 0.3", 2nd
ASTM A-607 still , 0,
liKin, 0.3", 4th









pi im , 0.3", 2nd
ASTM A607 still, 0.133", 3rd
WCQ3
-7 ;9 2X4"STUDS 2"SIDING
SB BS *»13 FELT 1X6SHT 3/B"PLY
studs, 2x4"
wood siding, 2", double planking over
studs
BS, lst-sxterior— 1.5" Lap joints
•flit papir, 15*, 2nd
shiathing, 1st 6, 3rd—a 1 agonal 1 y laid
studs, 2x4", 4th-16"0.C.
gypsum, 3/3", 3th
timbirs, 5 5/9", 6th-i ntsri or -stacked
2x6" 's
ugOD/METAl,_CgMPgSITg3
79 35 BS F SHT STD GYP PLY SM BS, lst-ix tirior- 1 . 5" lap joints
flit papir, 15*, 2nd
shiathing, 1x6, 3rd-rj : agonal 1 v laid
studs, 2x4", 4th-L 3 " Q.C.
gypsum, 3/9", 5th
plywood, 3/4", 6th
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